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Abstract: Unbelievable", "unthinkable", "inconceivable" the 21st century opens a new era in the field of 
risk and crisis management. Recent crises, including the unconventional "9/11" terrorist 
attacks, swift world-wide contamination by the SARS virus, continental blackouts which can 
occur within the space of a few seconds, the continent-wide effects of a tsunami in unstable 
geopolitical zones, all seem to differ fundamentally from the seminal cases which gave birth 
to crisis management studies in the 80s - the tampering of Tylenol being the founding stone of 
the discipline. The trend seems to be accelerating, so that crises today are increasingly global, 
intertwined and "non text-book" events.  
The contents of the established crisis tool kit: risk analysis models, crisis management tools, 
text-book techniques, organisational check-lists and communication rules all seemed 
meritorious. Rightly so, because the lessons of the past still have their place. Failure to take 
them into consideration can ensnare any attempt at crisis management into the increasing 
complexities of the emerging crisis world, with potentially disastrous results. However, rear 
view mirror management is no solution, the discipline must move forwards. As observed by 
foresighted military strategists, the warning is clear: "do not prepare to fight the last war".  
This contribution aims to clarify the issue, identify the traps and outline some creative lines of 
response and initiative. 
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Gunfire Kills. Outdated ideas too.  
General Foch 
 
If reality is inconceivable,  
then we have to invent inconceivable paradigms 
Hegel 
 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
When the discipline of crisis management was developed some two decades ago, it was 
basically the art of dealing with a specific breakdown and/or severe potential turbulences in a 
complex system. The aim was to prevent unmanageable cascading and debilitating effects. 
However, one condition was taken as a given: the triggering event was generally identifiable, 
and occurring in relatively stable and delineated contexts. However, although a great deal has 
been achieved by the work of many1, we must now go far beyond.  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the global situation is infinitely more complex, 
blurred, and unstable 2,3. In every domain there seems to be a complete rupture, total change 
with the past, be it for environment, global climate, public health, technological risks, social 
dynamics, international relations or violence. The ingredients of these cleavages include 
radical surprises, potential global domino effects, real time dynamics, destruction of ultimate 
references (for example destruction of the species barrier in the BSE crisis or the fact that 
individuals and communities choose death rather than life). “9/11” casts a very long and 
pervasive shadow, but it is far from being the only challenge. It is just the keystone of a global 
mutation in our emerging world, where crises must be anticipated, prepared for, prevented as 
far as possible and emergency situations tackled. 
Our responsibility is to address the situation and to rethink our tools, organisations, 
mindset, culture, and training processes accordingly. The stakes are incredibly high, the 
difficulties more severe than ever. A real shift has occurred and the new challenges must be 
addressed, as it is not possible to entertain the option of failure.  
Due to the sensitivity and profound fears triggered by the issue, any attempt at risk 
management must satisfy two fundamental requirements :   
 
 
 
                                                 
1Among them: Fink, S. (1986): Crisis Management. Planning for the Inevitable, Amacom, American 
Management Association; Irvine, R. B. (1987): When you are the Headline - Managing a major News Story, 
Dow Jones-Irwin; Regester, M. (1989): Crisis Management. What to do when the unthinkable Happens, 
Hutchinson Business, London; Ten Berge,D. (1990): The First 24 Hours. A comprehensive guide to successful 
crisis communications, Basil Blackwell, Oxford; Lagadec, P. (1993): Preventing Chaos in a Crisis, McGraw 
Hill, London; Harvard Business Review (1994) : Crisis Management ; Heath, R. (1998): Crisis Management for 
Managers & Executives, Financial Times-Pitman Publishing.  
2 Lagadec, P. and Guilhou, X. (2002): The End of Zero Risk [La fin du risque zéro], Eyrolles, Paris. 
3OECD (2003): Emerging risks in the 21st century: An agenda for action. Report.  
2 
  
• Honest and focussed open-mindedness: General Foch saw into the heart of the 
problem. Being “a war behind”4 is a natural trap, as it is always very comfortable to 
base any policy on past experience. People tend to base their approach to risk on 
the deeply believed, much repeated and safe affirmation that there is “nothing new 
under the sun”5. The problem with this mindset, is that it excludes open questioning 
and can lead straight into bitter disasters, such as in 1914. General Bachelet 
acknowledged that “we marched into the industrial era with the agrarian mindset of 
the previous age”. The type of strategic errors made then are too easily repeated, as 
illustrated in the maxim “in 1914 we were caught totally unprepared. In 1940, we 
were fully prepared – for the First World War”6 . 
 
• Courage: officials or academics regularly and strenuously underline that the mere 
mention of anything that could represent a new challenge is a reprehensible and 
pathological manifestation of “pessimism”. However, optimism cannot be founded 
on blindness, evasion and defection. Optimism demands open questioning minds, 
personal involvement and a determined spirit of initiative.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to consider crisis management in this new global context. Three 
areas will be covered:  
 
1. The new frontiers of our shared safety and the challenges which we must now 
address - in other words, the field of emerging crises - go far beyond usual 
typologies.  
2. The mental blocks and resistances that are so dominant in the field and which 
threaten to lead us from one fiasco to another and which explain why they are so 
naturally predictable. If this in-depth examination is avoided there is no real 
possibility to find any promising outcomes. 
3.  The positive and creative dynamics to be generated if the challenges of our time 
are to be met. To a certain extent this is our historic responsibility.  
 
There is no doubt that these issues are inherently difficult and that our knowledge is still 
fragile, which inevitably limits suggestions and discussions. However, there is sufficient 
information to justify and give priority to urgent in-depth analysis of the situation and more 
importantly, to try and push this examination way beyond the normal boundaries. Proof  
comes too late, as illustrated by the story of Minerva’s owl which begins its flight only in the 
gathering dusk (G.W.F. Hegel, "Preface," Philosophy of Right," "Phenomenology of Spirit"). 
Of course patience and wisdom are essential to avoid illusion and traps. However, the urgency 
of these stakes is a total priority. Asking for ever more data, models, statistics, proofs, 
definitions and taxonomies must not be an excuse for inaction. We have sufficient signals to 
measure both this urgency and the crucial need for bold analysis, beyond conventional 
frameworks.7  As the hero of Camus’ novel La Peste says to the official who wants to know if 
                                                 
4Educational documentary films produced by Patrick Lagadec: Complexity Crises – Never Fight the Last War, 
Mike Granatt, A Partner of Luther Pendragon, London; Visiting Professor, University of Westminster. 
Previously: Head of the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Head of the UK Government 
Information and Communication Service, Communication Director of three major departments, Communication 
Director of London's Metropolitan Police Service, talking to Patrick Lagadec, editing Aurélien Goulet, June 
2004. 
5Ecclesiasticus (1:8-10) 
6Général Bachelet, in Lagadec, P. (2000) : Creative ruptures [Ruptures créatrices], Eyrolles, p. 179. 
7Quarantelli, E. (1996): “The Future is not Repeated: projecting disasters in the 21st Century from current 
trends”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Blackwell, vo. 4, n° 4, December, p. 228-240. Boin, 
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it “really” is the plague, before he takes action: “This is not a question of vocabulary, it is a 
question of time”.8  
 
My own position is that I believe that unconventional questioning must not only be the 
result of circumstance nor the preserve of terrorists. If we do not change our approach 
repeated failure and fiasco are inevitable. More constructively, the severe turbulences in our 
complex and unstable world must be turned around and used as opportunities for the basis of 
a new policy. We must engage a positive approach, based on honest and focused open 
mindedness, creativity and determination.9 There is no time to waste…  
 
Paradigm shift 
 
New Frontiers: Risks, vulnerabilities, and emerging crises  
 
“9/11” was a watershed in the experience of and approach to risks. The underlying paradigm 
has shifted from local to global. This shift is clearly illustrated in the the US reflection on 
“Homeland Security”, in particular in the many discussions concerning “critical 
infrastructures”. This debate emerged as early as 1997-8 in a US Presidential commission 10:  
« Our national defence, economic, prosperity, and quality of life have long depended on 
the essential services that underpin our society. These critical infrastructures – energy, 
banking and finance, transportation, vital human service, and telecommunications – must 
be viewed in the Information Age. The rapid proliferation and integration of 
telecommunication and computer systems have connected infrastructures to one another in 
a complex network of interdependence. This interlinkage has created a new dimension of 
vulnerability, which, when combined with an emerging constellation of threats, poses 
unprecedented national risk » (p. ix). 
 
The “9/11” Commission Report11 clarified the gap between the threats on one side and the 
mindsets and available competences on the other: 
  
« We believe that the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failure: in imagination, policy, 
capabilities, and management ». (p. 339) 
« Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies».  (p. 344) 
«  [it] was different from anything the government had faced before ». (p.348) 
« It is hardest to mount a major effort while a problem still seems minor. Once the danger 
has fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier– but it then may be too 
late ». (p. 350) 
« Government agencies also sometimes display a tendency to match capabilities to mission 
by defining away the hardest part of their job. They are often passive, accepting what are 
viewed as givens, including their efforts to identify and fix glaring vulnerabilities to 
                                                                                                                                                        
A. and P. Lagadec (2000) : “Preparing for the Future: Critical Challenges in Crisis Management”, Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, special issue on Crisis Preparation and Training, Guest Editors: Arjen 
Boin and Patrick Lagadec, vol. 8, n°4, December 2000, p. 185-191. Dror, Y, P. Lagadec, B. Porfiriev and E. 
Quarantelli (2001) : “Crises to come: comments and findings”, in U. Rosenthal, A. Boin, L. Comfort (2001) : 
Managing Crises, Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities, Charles Thomas Publisher, Springfield.  
8Camus, A. (1947): La Peste, Gallimard, (Livre de Poche n° 132, p. 43). 
9Lagadec, P. (2000): Ruptures créatrices, Eyrolles, Paris. 
10President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (1998), Critical Foundations, Protecting 
America’s Infrastructures, Washington D.C..  
11National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004): « The 9/11 Commission Report », 
Final Report, Authorized Edition, Norton.  
4 
  
dangerous threats would be too costly, too controversial, or too disruptive ». (p. 352) 
« Information was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or because of legal 
misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled. Effective operations were not launched. 
Often the handoffs of information were lost across the divide separating the foreign and 
domestic agencies of the government ». (p. 353) 
« However the specific problems are labeled, we believe they are the symptoms of the 
government’s broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the challenges of the 
twenty-first century. The agencies are like a set of specialists in a hospital, each ordering 
tests, looking for symptoms, and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending 
physician who makes sure they work as a team ». (p. 353) 
 
However, terrorism is not the only issue which requires global safety-security policy and 
“outside the box” crisis management. “9/11” is certainly the most spectacular but certainly not 
the only incident which has projected the world into a new and profoundly unstable orbit as 
far as crises are concerned. Consider the SARS episode (2003), which occurred as a result of 
the powerful interaction between an unknown virus and jet powered travel12; the power failure 
which affected North-Eastern USA and Canada (August 14, 2003); the black-out which 
plunged Italy into darkness some weeks later (28 September 2003); the 15000 fatal victims of 
the heat-wave episode in France (4-14 August 2003); the tragedy of the large scale fertiliser 
plant explosion in Toulouse, France (21 September 2001); the large-scale computer meltdown 
such as the one which occurred at Heathrow airport (4 June 2004); the BSE (Mad Cow 
Disease)  crisis13 which ended the illusion of a protective barrier between species (1996) and 
most recently the Tsunami tidal wave in Asia (26 December 2004). 
   
It is not any specific uncertainty or singular event, but the general trend which seems to 
have propelled mankind into a disconcerting universe, which has disrupted the global 
conditions of risk assessment and crisis management. Even with no actual event: the mere 
plausibility of largely open scenarios has transformed the conditions of risk governance in our 
times.14  
 
Generic challenges 
 
Following a major event, the usual line of action is to list the various risks and to clarify 
practical responses for each category. However, the new complexities are such that a different 
and more strategic approach is needed. The generic problems linked to the new unstable state 
of the world and the new risk frontiers must be elicited. Fundamentally, these in-depth 
challenges outclass our paradigms, organisations and tools. The following ‘fault lines’ can be 
considered:  
 
• Discontinuity: our intellectual baggage has been designed for a stable and linear world 
with only limited and marginal uncertainty, where events and the contexts in which 
they occur can be clearly compartmentalised. But this is not the world in which 
today’s crises emerge. Threats and challenges now occur in a context of instability and 
                                                 
12Lagadec, P. and Rosenthal, U. (eds.) (2003): “Anthrax and Beyond: New Challenges, New Responsibilities”, 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Special Issue, Volume 11, Number 3, September 2003. 
13Lord Phillips, J. Bridgeman and M. Ferguson-Smith (2001): The BSE Inquiry, vol 1. Findings and 
Conclusions, London, Stationary Office. 
14Educational documentary films produced by Patrick Lagadec : Crisis, Complexity and Governance – From 
Emergency  to Political Science, Arjen Boin ,  Crisis Research Center, Leiden University (NL), talking to Patrick 
Lagadec, editing Aurélien Goulet, April 2004.  
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poorly defined frontiers. In these situations, averages, statistical regularities and 
historical trends provide neither an adequate, nor even relevant basis to tackle the 
problem. Technically we are equipped to treat massive phenomena involving swarms 
of points which can be modelled and plotted. However, in modern crises the situation 
may hang on one single outlier point, which becomes the swing point. Our intellectual 
tradition is ill-suited to deal with sudden mutations and non-linear qualitative jumps. 
We have trained ourselves to ignore differences which are manifestly outside the 
analysis of variance. Now we must confront phenomena outside “accepted” scales, 
shifting problems and difficulties from the edges, where they could be forgotten, to the 
core. For example, insurance mechanisms for covering damage used to work quite 
adequately. Today, the type of threats which loom mean that the entire paradigm base 
of insurance policy must be reviewed.15 We used to work in stable, known contexts 
with a few difficulties and irregularities at the margins. But now the inconceivable has 
entered the field of our daily range of certainties, the improbable wild outliers have 
moved from the periphery (where they could be conveniently forgotten) to centre 
stage.16  
 
• Ignorance: The accepted practice in any difficult situation is first to consult expert 
opinion, make an informed decision and then “communicate”. Now, the expert finds 
himself sidetracked in the validation of these models. Whether the crisis is mad cow 
disease, SARS or the material resistance of the Twin Towers, in each case expert 
opinion has been at a loss to provide answers within the tiny decision time scale 
available. The traditional position of the expert as one who delivers reference 
knowledge has been usurped. Dominique Dormont, an expert on prion structure, 
highlighted this radical change:  « The first message which experts have to transmit to 
the relevant authorities must underline the limits of current knowledge »17. Similarly, 
while policy-makers become encircled in their desire to provide « reassurance », 
barriers disintegrate almost visibly around them. This was highlighted by a veterinary 
specialist : « We are faced with an impossibility; experimental science cannot affirm 
something that does not exist »18. The same deliberately constructed indeterminism is 
also naturally evident in terrorism. 
 
• Massive domino effects, high speed contagion, erratic effects: over time we have 
mastered the art of dealing with cleanly defined accidents and emergencies. Our 
societies are not armed to cope with ultra-rapid, geographically dispersed contagion on 
a massive scale. It is quite probable that the source of any threat can now be 
geographically very far removed from the point of impact; and the effects of 
                                                 
15Kunreuther, H. and Michel-Kerjan, E. (2004). Insurability of (Mega)-Terrorism: Challenges and 
Perspectives. Report for the OECD Task force on Terrorism Insurance. Paris: OECD; Kunreuther, Howard and 
Michel-Kerjan, Erwann. (2004), “Policy watch New Challenges for Terrorism Risk Coverage in the US”, 
Journal of economic Perspectives, fall 2004.  “La couverture des situations hors normes : de nouveaux repères à 
inventer”, in O. Godard, Cl. Henry, P. Lagadec, Erwann Michel-Kerjan : Traité des nouveaux risques, 
Gallimard, Folio actuel, 2002 (p. 464-548). 
16Educational documentary films produced by Patrick Lagadec: Inconceivability – From the periphery to the 
core, Pr. Uriel Rosenthal, Chairman CRT, Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management, The Hague, 
Professor of Management Studies, Leiden University, Member of the Dutch Senate, talking to Patrick Lagadec, 
editing Aurélien Goulet,  April, 2004. 
17Dominique Dormont: “Expertise in major episodes of crisis and rupture” [“L’expertise dans les grands 
épisodes de crises et de ruptures”], in Patrick Lagadec, Ruptures créatrices, op. cit. p. 342. 
18Philippe Baralon: “Food safety : a cleavage in the food sector” [“Sécurité des aliments : une rupture pour les 
filières alimentaires”], in Patrick Lagadec, Ruptures créatrices, op. cit. p. 358. 
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propagation can be startling. This was the case with SARS, where the unknown virus 
spread at (literally) jet speed from Hong Kong to Toronto via the transport 
communication hubs of the planet, from hospital to hospital (for example when the 
specialised staff works in several hospitals, all the key lines of defence are rapidly 
taken out). This was also the case for anthrax: the problem was not a specific 
contaminated letter, but contagion in the sorting systems – here the network actually 
becomes part of the strategy of the attack, providing industrial-scale efficiency. 19 The 
weapon is the network.  
 
• Submergeant information, the Larsen media effect: information sources are now 
almost infinite (the same phenomenon is diffracted worldwide, and the complexity of 
the organisations seems to shatter the echo into penetrating fragments); news travels 
almost instantaneously around the global media networks and most particularly when 
the information is very uncertain and unsettling. Emotion has become a central factor 
of any reality, because emotion is the essential nerve of the media. The Larsen effect –
the electro-acoustic phenomenon of feedback between microphone and amplifier 
resulting in maximum sound output – quickly overwhelms any attempt at reasoned 
information. Excellent classic media communication is possible, but how can any 
decision-maker cope when the whole context of an event is overwhelming? 
Structurally speaking, the media networks still seek and recycle any event which best 
suits their working tools and so favour « camera-ready disasters ». These are simple 
stories, binary formulae which combine maximum emotion with overt simplification 
particularly when the complexity of the situation threatens the entire data treatment 
system. 
 
• The citizen on the front line: the 9/11 Commission of Inquiry specifically highlighted 
the fact that the traditional model of « State intervenes, citizen receives aid » has 
attained its limit. The lesson of 9/11 for civilians and first responders can be stated 
simply: in the new age of terror, they —we— are the primary targets. The losses 
America suffered that day demonstrated both the gravity of the terrorist threat and the 
commensurate need to prepare ourselves to meet it. The first responders of today live 
in a world transformed by the attacks on 9/11. Because no one believes that every 
conceivable form of attack can be prevented, civilians and first responders will again 
find themselves on the front lines. We must plan for that eventuality. A rededication to 
preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we lost that 
day. »20. Similarly, inquiries conducted after the severe 1998 ice storms in Quebec, led 
to the conclusion that citizens should ensure themselves a certain subsistence 
autonomy (“three days autonomy, to be the responsibility of each citizen for himself 
and family applicable at all periods of the year”),21 particularly in terms of energy 
needs. This decision was taken in order to allow the authorities to deal with vital 
networks without having to concentrate on all fronts and from every angle of the 
shattered fragments of a problem.  
                                                 
19Michel-Kerjan, Erwann. (2003): “New Challenges in Critical Infrastructures: A U.S. Perspective”, Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management. Volume 11, Number 3, September 2003, p. 132-141. 
20 « The 9/11 Commission Report », op. cit., p. 323.  
21Report of the Scientitic and Technical Commission inquiry into the events of the ice storm 5th to 9th January 
1998 « Facing the unforeseeable – Lessons of the 98 ice storm » [Rapport de la Commission scientifique et 
technique chargée d’analyser les événements relatifs à la tempête de verglas survenue du 5 au 9 janvier 1998 : 
« Pour affronter l’imprévisible – Les enseignements du verglas de 98 »], Nicolet Report, Les Publications du 
Québec, 1999, p. 236. 
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• Global dynamics of the destructuration of known phenomena, loss of orientation, loss 
of reference points. Each of the identified phenomena intermeshes as it occurs. The 
result is that the solid base of our knowledge, our hold on the natural world is at best 
subject to uncertainty,  at worst positively wrong or even destroyed. For example, the 
loss of the certainty that the species barrier was the ultimate protective wall, between 
man and diseases rampant in other species. Similarly the loss of the very 
characteristics defining temperate climate. Or again that an aggressor attacks in the 
certain knowledge that he will lose his own life – a strategy which totally destroys the 
foundations of the techniques of negotiation, namely that the negotiation is conducted 
with someone who values his own life. Considering a death sentence for a kamikaze is 
clearly nonsense. The context is now entirely new, all previous approaches, 
commentary and postures have been turned upside down. The principle of the “new” 
unconventional events is that they all seem to apply the principle of Sun Tzu where 
“the best warfare strategy is to attack the enemy's plans” (chapter 3)22. 
 
• Governance, not communication. These episodes are essentially “crises” as defined by 
the ancient Greeks, namely they are fundamental moments of truth. The hardest thing 
to grasp is their meaning. Business-as-usual “management” is no longer adequate. The 
problem must be seen and tackled from a multiplicity of fresh angles, new choices 
identified and the logic of the actors involved redrawn – none of this falls under what 
was traditionally accepted to be management technique and expertise. As Xavier 
Raufer forcefully states: “the art of politics is not management alone!”23. This quote 
highlights the extent to which “good crisis management techniques”, the tried and 
tested “recipes for crisis communication” are not only severely limited but misleading.  
 
• From rationality to wager? Perhaps the most destabilising factor, is that emerging 
crises confront us with situations, at the beginning of which nobody can know with 
any assurance whether ultimately they will be classed as minor, critical, extremely 
severe, monstrous, or…a non event. AIDS was no great concern in the early days of 
the pandemic, and yet it has now become a historic threat of monumental proportions, 
especially for Africa. Conversely, when BSE emerged, some specialists predicted a 
global disaster, in reality the mortality from the disease can be counted in hundreds in 
the United Kingdom and single figures in France; and not the millions of deaths 
predicted. Again for SARS, the bark was considerably worse than the bite. At the time 
no-one could assess the gravity of the problem and the Director of the Atlanta Center 
for Disease Control, the worlds leading centre of expertise in the field, stated to the 
media that the death toll could rise to 16 million if it developed into a pandemic. Over-
estimation was certainly not the problem for the 2003 European heat wave. The initial 
alert estimated 50 deaths, the final count was nearly 15 000 in France. In the case of 
terrorism, the issue achieves a state of paroxysm as to what can or cannot be excluded. 
Responses run into problems of either catastrophic under-provision of measures of 
protection, or on the contrary massive over-provision. Or again there is the real risk of 
not even being able to define what is over-reaction or under-reaction. The swing point 
can occur at any moment, anywhere, from any event or news of an event whether 
founded or not. 
 
                                                 
22 Sun-Tzu:  The principles of Warfare, The Art of War, http://www.sonshi.com/sun3.html. 
23Xavier Raufer : “Terrorism and security in the new world disorder” [“Terrorisme et sécurité dans le nouveau 
désordre mondial”], in Patrick Lagadec, Ruptures créatrices, op. cit. p. 209. 
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Our rules of governance easily run aground in this new universe. The risk is avoidance 
strategies, waiting paralysis. There is also the danger of repeated U turns in risk policy, which 
are (rightly) perceived as incomprehensible and which in any case are always a stroke behind. 
The ultimate trap is when fear becomes the driver of governance, which can lead to all 
manner of distasteful actions under the cover of “safety/security” – and where any dissention 
becomes labelled as treason. In this way terrorism can extend the reach of its empire without 
any actual attack, it merely has to play on the capacity of the system to close in on itself. Sun 
Tzu is still right: “to subjugate the enemy's  army without doing battle is the highest of 
excellence” (chapter 3). Other risks also dramatically reinforce the feeling that society has lost 
its reference points. Thus the cycle of denial- dazed- manipulation is fed by fear. 
 
To counter this lethal process we need both new systems of intelligence and of governance. 
These systems are still embryonic, they must be developed. The first step is trying to 
understand what could possibly block or slow the necessary reinvention of the machinery of 
action.  
 
The Trap: Fear and Paralysis 
 
Fierce resistance 
 
Our emergency culture is primarily equipped to grasp specific, limited problems, and solve 
them with specific responses. A crisis manager copes well as long as “a crisis” can be defined 
as a somewhat delicate situation requiring specifically adapted materials, plans, checklists and 
organisational tools and rules. Here, the manager just has to request a list of the likely risks 
and crises. Using this information he can delegate the task of preparing response plans and 
response data sheets and can recommend the implementation of practices to ensure that all the 
prepared responses and response equipment are in good working order. The crisis once neatly 
packaged, complete with set responses is domesticated, controlled and can be “rubber-
stamped” as acceptable. 
 
It is far more difficult to try and bend the mindset of individuals and groups to work on the 
essentials of the crises: any event outside normal experience presents extraordinary 
challenges, which by definition do not come with a prepared set of desirable responses. When 
it comes to preparing for unconventional events, most organisations try to tackle the problem 
with some “media training”. However, it is very disturbing to observe that any attempt within 
any organisation to go beyond this approach and to develop a crisis culture, whether 
conducted by external specialists or internal managers, systematically meets with ferocious 
resistance or determined inertia.  
 
Experience repeatedly highlights the following observations with sickening regularity: 
 
• When a “What if?” type question is asked on hypothetical issues of safety not normally 
examined, the reaction is always instantaneous, brutal and final: “We are here to tackle 
problems, not to create new ones”. “Sorry, but I am pragmatic, we are solutions people 
here, not theoreticians.” 
 
• Suggesting that normal lines of defence could be bypassed – that “unsurmountable” 
barriers might be crossed? The credibility of the initiator of the discussion is 
fundamentally at stake: “For goodness sake, we are optimists here!”  
9 
  
• Suggesting  to someone lower down in the line management that a simulation could and 
should be organised? Quickly rejected out of hand: “I am afraid that here we don’t play at 
involving top management, top management would never accept it here. In any case, we 
never check who is actually qualified to intervene among the top managers who are on 
duty”. 
 
• Suggesting, that during a simulation an unconventional complication, outside the usual 
rituals could be introduced? The response is always horrified “Certainly not, it would 
destroy the exercise!” 
 
• Suggesting to a major multinational group, that an in-depth study could be conducted on 
major vulnerabilities? This leads to instant refusal on the grounds that “No, all we need is 
a plan and some media training for some of our directors. ” 
 
• Suggesting that a president or minister could be included in an exercise, to give a little of 
their time to the problem of unconventional crises? This usually elicits sighs and concern: 
“We do not bother that level with this type of issue; anyway they simply don’t have the 
time. Prepare a clear information sheet and they might just drop in.” 
 
• Suggesting an unusual and major innovation after a difficult event, for example an 
experience exchange, an initiative to be conducted with others? Elicits the response 
“Listen, we managed to get out of this one, let’s not make things any more complicated.” 
 
• Suggesting that certain partnerships could be considered? This is the crowning lesson on 
the fact that the economic context is ferociously competitive and that any information 
sharing could prejudice the share of markets, budgets and territory. Interestingly, this 
attitude is very similar in both the public and private sectors: everywhere competition for 
territory is bitter, fundamental and identity-defining. 
 
• Suggesting to an excellent management team that it might be good to reflect on the new 
frontiers of risk that affect that company? “Impossible, our teams are engaged in 
calculations, have models to follow which are in their normal line of work. They would 
not tolerate overt questioning of their systems.” 
 
• Suggesting to multinational institutions that they could include issues of governance in 
highly unstable conditions on the agenda? “No, we are organising a meeting with 
technical experts who will present specific scenarios. The rest is off the agenda”. “We 
cannot include or decide anything if it has not been requested by all of our members, 
which is not the case at the moment”. 
 
There is an infinite number of specific examples. The important trend is the homogeneity of 
the retreat: no questions, no anticipation beyond the bounds of known experience, no 
inclusion of the higher tiers of management, no simulations on events which might fall 
outside the normal rituals, no audacious partnerships. The field is wide open for crises… 
 
It is important to measure the depth of this resistance. 
• Example: In May 1989, speaking on the topic of “new risks” at a conference organized by 
a major international organization in Ottawa, the General who passed me the microphone 
had time to whisper under his breath: “Whatever you do, don’t scare them!”. This was 
just a few months before the fall of the Berlin wall. 
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• Example: Eleven years later, in June 2001, at a Defence Zone meeting on the same 
subject at Marseilles in France, a highly placed defence official who had come down to 
the meeting from Paris interrupted me. He announced “I cannot let this continue. In 
France things are under control. I am optimistic”. Strong words from the Defence official. 
However, during the cocktail party afterwards the same official came to me and confided 
that “You were right, but I couldn’t let that be said to the heads of regional government 
(Préfets)”. This was just two months before 9/11. 
 
To any suggestion of work or new ideas on the subject, the most favourable response today is 
“Let me think about the best way of selling the idea, otherwise we will immediately come up 
against a wall of resistance”. Surely the time has come for ideas on the issue to be received 
more creatively. 
 
The problem is not even of resistance to change. The blockage goes far deeper. The stakes are 
very high and it is these same stakes that we must try to understand.  
 
 
Testing the resistance 
 
The fact is that on this issue a number of fault lines converge. The situation is very worrying 
and calls for very strong corrective action.     
 
Intellectual handicap 
Anything that is unusual, exceptional and non linear is instinctively rejected by our society. It 
is as if our approach has remained stationary since the natural philosophers of the 17th 
century: 
 “Causes which result in effects which are rare, violent and sudden must not affect us, they 
are not part of the ordinary process of Nature. Our causes and reasons  are the effects that 
occur each day, movements that follow one another, effects that are continually renewed 
and endlessly repeated”. (Buffon, 1749) 24 
 
Uriel Rosenthal one of the pioneers in crisis study, notes that this tradition has remained 
central and currently blocks crisis management: 
 
“Scientists feel uncomfortable with phenomena that seem beyond the scope of the neatly 
crafted theories which have been developed on the basis of normal circumstances and 
events. Crises seem to be in total opposition to the very foundations of modern social 
science.”25 
 
Or as A. Weinberg stated rather more forcefully: 
« Science deals with regularities in our experience; art deals with singularities »26 
 
It would seem that unconventional problems will remain orphan: they repel scientists who 
like phenomena to be regular, reproducible and measurable. Leaving it to the artists is 
                                                 
24In: Théorie de la Terre (1749), cited by Jean Delumeau and Yves Lequin: Les Malheurs des temps – Histoire 
des fléaux et des calamités en France ; Mentalités: vécu et représentations, Larousse, 1987, p. 397. 
25Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T. Charles, Paul ‘t Hart. Ed. (1989): Coping with crises. The Management of 
Disasters, Riots and Terrorism, Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, Springfield, Illinois (p. 5). 
26A. Weinberg, Science and its Limits : The Regulator’s Dilemma. Issues in Science and Technology 2 (1): 59-
72. 
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certainly not going to be enough. And whoever takes an interest in these phenomena will have 
great trouble to be taken “seriously”. 
 
Managerial handicap 
Ralph Stacey, professor of strategic management has stated that:  
 “At least 90% of the content of textbooks on strategic management concentrate on the 
relatively easy part of the management task, namely the running of the organizational 
machine in as surprise-free way as possible […]. On the contrary, the real management 
task  involves tackling exceptions quickly and without pressure, coping with and even using 
unpredictability, clashing counter-cultures. The real task is about managing instability, 
irregularity, difference and disorder.” 27 
 
The fact is that today when flung into these situations, managers are highly likely to react 
clumsily or simply be confused. To make matters worse, any invitation to prepare for the 
abnormal is taken as unfounded, illegitimate or even provocative. 
 
Governance handicap 
Because crises and unconventional events are unplanned, the arguments opposing any real 
strategic preparation and any personal engagement by people in governance positions are 
recurrent. The positive results of personal engagement are very clearly illustrated in the way 
in which Rudolf Giuliani, the then mayor of New York, totally involved himself in crisis 
exercises for the city, in particular in July 200128. 
 
Psychological handicap 
This is probably the most determining problem. A crisis event can effectively strip the 
manager of all his sense of direction, casting him adrift of all his structuring and supporting 
frameworks, with the loss of everything justifying his social position (responsibility, 
respectability, power, identity). Consequently, crisis situations confront the manager with the 
risk of facing total surprise (in the words of Sun Tzu: “Is it not at this point that half a step in 
the wrong direction could put me thousands of kilometres away?”). Clearly this is profoundly 
destabilising and destructuring for somebody unprepared. It cannot be sufficiently hammered 
out that a crisis is not a calculable event and no perfect model can be made to fit. Rather it 
places the manager in front of an incomprehensible precipice; and there are no quick fixes to 
fill this void. 
 
At this point the analysis of the situation becomes almost psychoanalytical, due to the 
powerful and often irrepressible emotions which surface among both individuals and groups 
in critical situations (even a planned exercise regularly evokes the same type of 
destabilisations). As the psychoanalyst Nicole Fabre has commented on Descartes: 
 
 “His thoughts are a whole. His work also. There is no crack through which it can be 
attacked. There are no voids. His belief is that there is no vacuum in nature. As such his 
controversy with vacuum, in particular with Pascal’s “quick-silver experiments” and his 
                                                 
27Ralph Stacey (1996): Strategic Management & Organizational Dynamics, Pitman, London (p. 19-20). 
28The July exercise was followed by the decision to organise a follow-up exercise on the 12th September 2001. 
The follow-up exercise included evacuation of the crisis centre – which is exactly what had to be done during the 
real crisis on the 11th September. Patrick Lagadec educational film documentaries: World Trade Center, 11 
September 2001, Interview with James Ellson, Technical advisor to the American authorities for the 11th 
September 2001, previously in charge of emergency planning against terrorist attack for the city of New York, 
July 2002, editing, sub titles: Aurélien Goulet, 2002. 
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refusal to consider the existence of any vacuum, is so surprising in this man who referred 
to experiment whenever possible, to the extent that it is impossible not to see in this refusal 
the expression of his personality or his mode of reasoning. So much so, that I must speak of 
this refusal in terms of resistance. If Descartes resisted the notion of vacuum so 
completely, if the notion of emptiness was so inconceivable and shocking to him, it must be 
that to him the notion of vacuum symbolised nothingness or chaos. It represents a risk of 
disorder. Descartes’ use of rationality to reject this concept so vigorously, manifests his 
fear of nothingness (death?) and the fear of losing his hold on the solidity of a system 
which he values because it presents not the slightest chink.” 29 
 
It also seems appropriate to add to this reflection some of Freud’s words, modified slightly to 
suit current purposes [indicated in square brackets]. Thus adapted, the world of crises appears 
as foreign to today’s managers and policy makers (used to dealing with “normal” phenomena) 
as psychoanalysis was to the doctors and experts of Freud’s time. Introductory Lectures on 
Psycho-Analysis can be reread in this light because the way psychoanalysis was considered at 
its conception, seems to have clear parallels with the debate on the best way to tackle crisis 
situations today – a disconcerting world that destabilises and initiates all sorts of rejection 
mechanisms.  
 
« I will show you how the whole trend of your previous education and all your habits of 
thought are inevitably bound to make you into opponents of [crisis] and how much you 
have to overcome in yourselves in order to get the better of this instinctive opposition » (p. 
18.) 
« You have grown accustomed to regarding [crisis] with suspicion, to denying it the 
attribute of being scientific, and to handing it over to [journalists, victims, judges, and 
even terrorists]. This limitation is without doubt detrimental to your activity [of 
governance] […] and I fear that you will be obliged as a punishment to leave  part of the 
influence you are seeking to the lay practitioners, nature curers and mystics whom you 
despise so much » (p. 23)30. 
 
Although these references may seem out of context, they are essential. The crisis situation, the 
loss of references almost automatically makes psychology the major issue, both at group and 
individual level. In practice, collective fear and panic repeatedly exacerbate managerial, 
governance or intellectual handicaps. Profound destabilisation leads to negation, 
compulsive/extreme rationalisation or avoidance… 
 
These handicaps would not be such cause for concern if ignorance in the field was not slowly 
growing and our technologies and understanding were constantly pushing back the frontiers 
of uncertainty. However, as highlighted by Bernstein in his cult book Against the Gods, this is 
not the case. After a detailed historical study of uncertainty, Bernstein concludes with 
considerable insight: 
 
« Discontinuities, irregularities, and volatilities seem to be proliferating rather than 
diminishing. »31 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Nicole Fabre: L’inconscient de Descartes, Bayard, Paris, 2004, p. 91. 
30Sigmund Freud: Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, The Standard Edition, Liveright, 1977.  
31Peter L. Bernstein: Against the Gods. The remarkable Story of Risk, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, 1998, p. 329. 
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The straightjacket of daily routine  
 
The task of decision makers is exacerbated by the tyranny of daily routine, which complicates 
the fundamental difficulties described above. The complexity is “real time” which engenders 
saturation at all levels. All available time and energy is swallowed up in the tactical 
management of daily operations. This in itself is the leitmotiv of decision makers who see no 
time available for temporally projected reflections, open-minded questioning, initiatives and 
cross fertilisation of ideas. 
 
The avalanche of contributing factors caused by current trends including the acceleration and 
march of globalisation in the business world, the violence of the shocks which seem to call for 
ever more stringent and weighty administrative operations (whether for control, 
accompaniment, repair, etc.) and the focus of everyone on stable features among the universal 
changes constantly taking place, leaves very little room for manœuvre. This has occurred at 
exactly the time when only an increase in the wiggle factor can allow immediate tactical 
obstacles to be overcome.  
 
The meagreness of the room for manœuvre has to be measured and understood before any real 
progress can be made. If not, failure is inevitable, accompanied by all the regular ritual: 
announcement of a new national priority every two days depending on the ups and downs of 
the news; communication instead of governance; compensation for the lack of personal 
involvement with poorly defined rules to be imposed on others; with the final conclusion 
every time that the ultimate learning lesson is that “children need to be taught these things as 
from primary school”.  
 
Clearly, given all the problems, there are no easy solutions. But the pressure of reality is upon 
us. The risk threshold is repeatedly exceeded, redefined and the handicaps afflicting our 
capacity for preparation, reaction, implication and leadership have given rise to very 
disturbing responses. Three seemingly accelerating factors appear to govern destabilisation: 
 
• The disarray of specialists and managers, confronted with the new interconnected 
complexity of vulnerability, in a context of exacerbated instability, about which our 
ignorance appears ever increasing and invasive. 
 
• The increasing mistrust of the people involved who have experienced the hollow 
traditional verbal assurances, on the lines of “everything is under control”, and observed 
the U-turn to the new theme “we have no control over events but we guarantee good, 
transparent communication”. 
 
• The threat of decoupling between decision makers and managers on one side and the 
wider public on the other. The danger is that, on a rapidly approaching horizon, radical 
shift occurs in reaction, from the consensual “Never again” to the “Let them all go to 
hell!”. The dynamics of this shift can be characterised as going from explosion to 
implosion.32 
 
These difficulties are being studied and must be addressed. 
                                                 
32Patrick Lagadec and Laura Bertone, with Xavier Guilhou: Journey to the heart of an implosion – lessons to be 
learned from Argentina, Eyrolles, September 2003. [Voyage au cœur d’une implosion – ce que l’Argentine nous 
apprend.]  Ruptura y reconstruction – Lo que la experiencia argentina nos enseño, Evolucion, Buenos Aires, 
noviembre 2003. 
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The Creative Dynamics Needed 
 
These issues cannot be solved by any quick and easy recommendations, with attached 
checklist. They are real challenges, with real twists and turns – each one characterised by a 
unique set of surprise, shock, unthinkable…. but also positive opportunities. 
 
There are two basic lines of approach and both must be engaged. First, in-depth groundwork, 
to provide the basic information to address the new challenges, even if the boundaries are 
sometimes chaotic. Secondly, an effort towards adjustment / safeguarding to provide a better 
basis for dealing with immediate turbulences. 
 
 
Building fundamental strengths 
 
We must try and generate a radical turn-around on a number of fronts. Rupture but in a 
positive and creative sense. The following list is not exhaustive:  
 
A radical change in intellectual approach 
The road map is nearly a clean white page and because it is such, it invokes all the paralysis 
which goes with this information vacuum. The perspective of the issues must be literally up-
ended. Issues which had previously existed “on the periphery” have been brought centre stage 
and must now be treated as core issues and not freak events. The “known world” no longer 
exists, the comfortable world where we conducted our activities and projects, with recognised 
measures of excellence with a few discrete little uncertainties at the edges. In the past these 
marginal uncertainties were only worthy of attention if they fell into validated theories 
supported by robust statistical evidence, neatly cleaned free of untidy outliers. The new 
frontiers of knowledge and the focus of intense and urgent intellectual effort must now 
concentrate on events and data excluded until now: discontinuity, irreversibility, extremes, 
volatility, radical change, crystallisation and resonance. This work must be conducted both 
vertically in all disciplines and horizontally across all disciplines. These subjects must stop 
being taboo and the work undertaken must not be lip service paid to the wild peripheries, a 
small concession simply to maintain basic order. The challenge is there, ready to be taken up 
by the best brains and specialists. If this movement is not tackled with determination and 
conviction, the intellectual world will disengage. When turbulence and mind numbing events 
occur, challenging all the reference points of our world and disturbing the tranquillity of our 
accepted paradigms, arguments that anything “out of the box” is not science are not 
acceptable. We need new tools for the new challenges and the closer these tools can be 
brought to the people at the front line of the management procedure, the less they will refuse 
the obstacles which confront them. 
 
Intense involvement at the highest levels 
When confronted with such weighty matters that concern identity, survival, plans and visions 
for the future, nothing can be done without intense, personal, direct involvement by the key 
players in the organizations concerned. For example, during the “9/11” crisis, the actions of 
Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of New York, went far beyond mere circumstantial “media 
communication” and were a determining factor in the management of the entire situation: 
“Have beliefs and communicate them. See things for yourself. Set an example. Prepare 
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relentlessly. Underpromise and overdeliver. Don’t assume a damn thing”.33 Those who 
occupy the highest offices are expected to be on the front lines, where the stakes are high, 
mobilizing people capable of taking charge. Those involved must receive the powerful 
message, that nothing less is expected of them. To date this type of direct and personal 
implication by leaders is very much the exception - in all countries.  
 
A shrinking ability to think on our feet 
Plunged into a world of violent turbulence, organizations must be led, mobilized and 
empowered in new terms. The acquisition of a specific, rigid technical arsenal to respond to 
an unusual situation is no longer adequate. Advance planning, a high level of responsiveness 
to weak signals, at the highest level, are essential in order to anticipate sudden change, 
counter ethically unacceptable reactions and build the necessary networks of actors. Due to 
the elements of surprise and complexity and the aberrative nature of the events, organizations 
must develop new ways of monitoring situations. Leaders must be able to rely on people 
accustomed to operating in a crisis, people capable of objective stepping back and assessment, 
whenever a sensitive situation arises. This skill is particularly necessary to counteract the 
inability to think, perhaps the most seriously pathological reaction to the new forms of crisis 
(“In a crisis, you don’t have time to think”); to counteract, in the same line, a sort of “bunker 
mentality” which emerges with each person holed up in his own little corner and adopting the 
easiest approach to problems, usually purely technical, without examining the underlying 
positions. 
 
Today, more than ever before, great crises will lead to great disaster unless sufficient thought 
and ability for strategic leadership are developed. The Spanish (mis)management of the 
Prestige disaster34 and the fiasco of the 11 March 2003 should serve as a final warning here, 
for Europe as well. During a recent international simulation, we were able to see the degree to 
which the lack of strategic ability in these areas was determinant. The European political 
capability was exhausted in only two hours. In fact, the expression “Crises as Institution 
Killers”35 was coined to express what we observed then.  
 
Experience exchange “clubs”  
The critical barrier is the profound anxiety which instantly emerges with any “out of the box” 
event, where there are no coded and validated responses. We must all (and this applies 
particularly to those exercising the highest levels of authority) engage the search for best 
approaches to these difficult territories. Although still at a very embryonic stage, “clubs” for 
the sharing and exchange of problems, questions and solutions have proved successful. This 
type of forum has been much appreciated by those who have taken the step to take part. 
Together, the participants address the destabilisation factor of major surprise, of the 
unmanageable, the unthinkable, and subsequently prove far more able to cope with situations 
and actually exercise their responsibilities. These clubs cannot provide easy solutions - no 
checklists, no standard practice - but they do enable participants to take a more objective 
approach, to understand that each event is unique and that as such management directions 
must be tailored to the actual challenge being faced.  However, these clubs can only continue 
                                                 
33 Rudolph W. Giuliani: Leadership, Miramax books, New York, 2002, p. X.  
34Debate at the European Union Mixed Commission, Meeting of MEPs, Madrid 5th December 2002, speech 
given by L. R. Zapatero on the crisis management, TVE2. 
35 UNDP Conference for South-East European Countries: "Building Transnational Crisis Management Capacity: 
an exploration of viable ways to improve civil security in South-East Europe", Bratislava, Slovakia, 23-25 
January 2003. 
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to be effective if they are provided with some guidelines and direction from time to time. 
Rigorous professionalism is needed, organising a meeting is not enough on its own... 
 
Civil society back in the loop 
In the same spirit, we must get past the notion that, in delicate situations, everything is 
immediately put in the hands of some government agency, under a single command, using a 
sort of military reasoning that believes that civil society will only “panic and give way to 
looting.” The example of the 1988 Quebec ice storms is quite instructive in this regard. The 
debriefing (largely open and extremely detailed) strongly emphasized the need to determine 
the response in close cooperation with citizen and NGO type organisations. For example, it 
was said that for such complex network failures the citizen had to be prepared to go it alone, 
cope with the situation at his level and wait as long as it took for service to be restored. The 
decision here being that the overriding priority was given to the structural restoration of the 
networks. 
 
Any other strategy can only lead to overall impotence and horrendous mistrust. This is not a 
militant view advocating some dangerous oversimplification. The shocks that will accompany 
the new world of risk will require modes of functioning which can no longer rely on our 
vision of a State that provides solutions to passive groups of people within a “Command and 
Control” philosophy.  
 
This also assumes other ways of looking at science. We must extricate ourselves from 
positivist thinking. In the words of a former British Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Robert May, 
at a recent European conference on science and governance36: “ In many important issues – 
both of safety and ethics ---science alone rarely gives unarguable answers. As Brecht wrote 
in his play The Life of Galileo: “The chief aim of science is not to open a door to infinite 
wisdom but to set a limit to infinite error”. We must re-examine our conception of 
information and democracy at a time of uncertainty, and even ignorance. The same Sir Robert 
May, in a deposition before the investigative committee on the bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in Great Britain, again pointed out positive approaches: “You 
can see the temptation on occasion to wish to hold the facts close so that you can have 
internal discussion and the formation of a consensus so that a simple message can be taken 
out into the market place. My view is strongly that that temptation must be resisted, and that 
the full messy process whereby scientific understanding is arrived at with all its problems has 
to be spilled out in the open.”37 
Here, we touch upon our most fundamental concepts of governance. At a large staff meeting 
of a large ministry, held a few years ago after several serious weather-related events, one of 
the national administrators argued for a new conception of the role of the State by citing: “To 
profess to solve all problems and to answer all questions would be impudent boasting, and 
would argue such extravagant self-conceit as at once to forfeit all confidence.” (Immanuel 
Kant, A Critique of Pure Reason). The meeting made known how much it agreed with this 
statement. A high official expressed his indignation, to emphasize the extent to which, on the 
contrary, the State had all the resources needed to perform its noble tasks. This issue lies at 
the core of our discussions on risk: is this an opportunity to raise questions and to take 
                                                 
36Sir Robert May: Bringing Science into Governance, Conference “Science and Governance in a Knowledge 
Society: The Challenge for Europe”, European Commission, Directorate General Joint Research Centre, 
Directorate General Research, 16-17 October 2000, Brussels.  
37Lord Phillips, J. Bridgeman and M. Ferguson-Smith (2001): The BSE Inquiry, vol 1. Findings and Conclusions, 
op. cit., p. 265 (§1297).  
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responsibility? Or, on the contrary, a danger that requires reaffirmation of the principle that 
“everything is under control” --- without, however, there being anything “reassuring” about it. 
 
 Here also there is a need to open, share and invent. However, to achieve this supposes that 
new approaches are available. For example, a few days before a public meeting on risk in 
Toulouse after the terrible explosion at the AZF factory on the 21 September 2001, I drew to 
the organisers’ attention the need to build in a new framework for sharing experiences and 
views. The reply was: “The speeches are ready”. It is very clear that the time has come to 
move on and to engage different practices. The real problem is that the paralysing nature of 
these challenges ‘freezes’ action.  
 
In the same way, involvement of citizens must be improved. For example, when emergency 
exercises are conducted, the heads and managers of institutions such as hospitals, schools, 
retirement homes etc. should be consulted in order to get a better idea in advance of their 
specific needs and constraints, and so target the testing of certain procedures. This would 
enable the old approach of “Do nothing until you receive orders” to be overturned in favour 
of “What would be the most useful for you and then we can test it together?” We can only 
reap the trust that is sown.  
 
Training 
The stakes are high. Until these areas have been explored and become part of the basic 
training in higher education programmes, it will be very difficult to include them on the 
agendas of our decision makers. These subjects will remain taboo if they do not become part 
of the identity, the reference training and the league tables of excellence for new generations 
of managers/decision makers. Without this in-depth preparation, the fear associated with 
major risk will remain too uncontrollable to enable any creative synergy to be generated.  
 
More positively the big question is to define the necessary basic grounding which our future 
managers (among others) need to be able to find the vision, balance, skills and ability to listen 
in a world constantly shaken by the shockwaves of permanent cleavages.  It is no longer 
sufficient to prepare them for a basically stable world where the rare and freak event requires 
“management”. On the contrary they must be trained to “manage” in a world where the 
dynamics and cleavages engendered by crises are structural realities.  
 
Immediate creative initiatives 
 
In addition to long term action, we must adopt more immediate strategies which may well be 
needed in the short term.  
 
Rapid Reflection Forces 
Major crisis events engender closure, seizure, the raising of barriers, and engagement in cul de 
sacs. In real terms, each nation with its own diversity of culture groups must designate a range 
of people who can be mobilised to deal with all aspects of an emerging major crisis. The same 
should be developed in industry. The lack of such teams was particularly evident during the 
Toulouse-AZF crisis, and again during the recent tsunami episode. The task is to identify the 
people who are both competent and able to remain operational in the face of unconventional 
crises and to make them work together to develop flexible but efficient strategies for crisis 
management. These people do exist but they are often dispersed. They must be brought 
together in teams and trained in order to extend their experience, skills and ability to ask 
questions, so that they may assist decision makers to cope with unconventional situations. In 
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building these teams, we must be careful not to fall into the usual rut of assuming that the 
members should be drawn from the established elite. In order to guarantee the essential open-
mindedness needed, the teams must include a whole range of people including women, 
foreigners, young people, etc. This approach is currently under discussion at European level, 
in particular within the framework of the European Crisis Management Academy. The next 
step is to move from idea to action.  
 
Minimum preparation for senior management 
From an institutional point of view, there are two current dominating topics in crisis 
management strategy: firstly, the preparation of crisis plans (often subcontracted) and 
secondly “crisis communication”, media training which is too often seen as the priority. This 
rather rigid compartmentalisation must be broken down, this type of “safe waters” response is 
no longer adequate and crisis management strategy must now make preparations to survive in 
the challenging “high seas” of risk today. Preparation for unconventional situations should be 
at the top of all senior management group agendas, from boards of directors, to executive 
committees and ministerial cabinets …without arguing that they already do this on a daily 
basis! 
 
Preparations and action partnerships 
Emerging crises give rise to organisational problems which have no identifiable frontiers. It is 
now urgent to engage those involved in their management in joint preparations and training. 
To encourage them to ask more and the right questions. For the last four years, the notion of 
partnership has dominated all meetings on “critical infrastructures”. The time has come to 
move into the action phase.  For example, this could involve studying scenarios such as the 
film “The Day Britain Stopped” (BBC, 2003). In this BBC film drama, Britain faces a 
national crisis in the country’s transport infrastructure which has been operating at virtually 
saturation point. A series of unfortunate events paralyses all transport systems – road, air, rail 
– resulting in snowballing chain of events; the interdependence of the decisions adopted by 
each of the key actors is ignored38 and the individually managed strategies all become 
unoperational. This programme is only a drama and although it lacks rigour on some points 
(as often criticised in the UK) the real question should be why should the monopoly of 
creating such scenarios be left to journalists? Why are the actual decision makers involved 
absent from the reflection and work to be accomplished? 
 
Tough, targeted and bold initiatives 
With a battlefield so vast and complex, it is necessary to move forwards in carefully thought 
out, very specific, but bold stages. In implementing a very specifically defined plan to achieve 
progress, the lesson can be learned that action is not suicidal, on the contrary it can be fertile. 
The very targeted nature of such initiatives is also crucial due to the constraint of time which, 
as already highlighted, is always in very short supply and does not permit the implementation 
of complex plans.  
 
Example: In February 2001, a major snowstorm on the Aix-Nice motorway (South of France) 
trapped 4,000 people on the road for nearly 36 hours. Weather conditions were unprecedented 
– 3 feet of snow in a few hours. Instead of claiming “force majeure”39, the Chairman of the 
corporation concerned (Escota), called a public debriefing. Through the press, all interested 
parties were invited to share their experiences at a public meeting three months later. 
                                                 
38Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther: “Interdependent Security: A General  Model”, The Wharton School, 
Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania, July 2004. 
39Force majeure – an uncontrollable event. 
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Moreover, this collective effort was supplemented at the meeting by joint consideration of 
what each participant could contribute to the safety of such a large network (which, for 
example, would require that trucks be held back at the Spanish and Italian borders if it were 
necessary to cut off traffic in Provence). The result was particularly interesting, as much for a 
better understanding of the incident and the problems to be confronted as for preparation for 
the future. In a word, the meeting afforded an opportunity to become better aware of the 
networks at work, and especially to create new networks among the various players --- the 
turnpike authority, government authorities, local officials, service stations, the weather 
service, truckers and motorists. 
 
Example: after the anthrax attacks in 2001 in the United States, and thousands of false alarms 
in Europe, I suggested to postal operators that they should organise an international meeting 
for experience exchange and to define some strong operational initiatives for the future.  The 
President of the French postal service La Poste, immediately agreed to the idea. In 2002, key 
representatives of about thirty operators attended the meeting in Paris to share their 
experience, the lessons they had learned and to set up an inter-network alert and information 
system. One month later, this new capacity was implemented and was used to deal with a new 
alert, coming again from the American network. A number of key factors made this operation  
such a success, a willingness to listen, to consult and to suggest innovative strategies.40  
 
How often is this type of information exchange engaged today after some major event? Many 
of the major actors in the Toulouse tragedy, regret today the lack of this type of initiative 
following the AZF explosion.41 In the SARS episode, it would also have been important to 
organise a meeting between the public health actors, representatives of the affected cities and 
governments and the transport sector in order to try and identify the big issues, centralize 
good ideas and strategies for progress. 
 
However, experience exchange is not the only solution. Strong initiatives must be instigated 
on a number of other fronts: questions need to be asked, simulations created, training 
organised, international public debate engaged etc. The time has come to be creative. We 
must be as innovative and proactive as the emerging crises are surprising and furtive. There 
must be one central belief, namely that it is only by taking the risk to try something new that 
creative opportunities are made. Only by taking risks do we stop being the prisoners of risk. 
We must be prepared, so that the taking of risks is less terrifying and paralysing than the 
perspective of a guaranteed fiasco.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the film “The Hunt for Red October” there is a key moment where the Commandant of the 
Soviet submarine announces to his officers that he has informed the Kremlin of his plan to 
defect, and take his ship to the West. His officers rebel violently against what seems to be a 
personal whim of their leader: “Suicidal” they cry. The Commandant calmly replies “But the 
problem is not the Russians!: I know their tactics!” This scene summarises the crucial 
challenge of any high risk situation: traditional approaches are totally submerged by events, 
                                                 
40Patrick Lagadec and Erwann Michel-Kerjan: “A Framework for Senior Executives to Meet the Challenge of 
Interdependent Critical Networks under Threats : The Paris Initiative – Anthrax and Beyond”, Working Paper, 
Center for Risk Management and Decision Process, The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania, July 
2004, WP#04-028. 
41This fact emerged clearly from the witness accounts of that event from the emergency services during the 
Congress of Catastrophe Medecine. (Toulouse 4-6 December 2002)  
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and so we can expect nothing from people in charge because we know that they have neither 
the culture nor the tools to rise to the occasion: it is a totally different game. 
Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures 
their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy 
operations in the field. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and 
thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.42 
 
The major risk today is the litany that “everything is under control” “that we mustn’t be 
pessimistic and therefore there is no point asking too many questions” whilst simultaneously 
insisting that citizens must abandon the notion of “zero risk” and lamenting society’s 
“unhealthy preoccupation with legal action”. If we do not have the courage to take strong, 
determined and open-minded initiatives, we run the risk of becoming increasingly bogged 
down in a bunker mentality. The risks will not wait for us to get ready and if we go from 
fiasco to fiasco, the will, energy and confidence to tackle the issues will collapse reinforcing 
the fears of the public, the authorities and feed into a dynamic and morbid loop. 
 
“Failure is not an option”. We must acquire the entire range of skills needed for the new 
challenges– intellectual, managerial, governance, psychological. We must visit the new 
frontiers with confidence, improve our intelligence about them and acquire brand new skills – 
vision and an entire strategy logic. In order to remain actor of our particularly turbulent period 
of history.  
 
Fear is the major assailant to be conquered at all costs, despite all temptations to the contrary 
and any collateral benefit which it may procure.  
 
In Philadelphia, birthplace of the US Declaration of Independence, the Liberty Bell  
proclaims: « Proclaim Liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof » 
(Leviticus 25:10). 
 
We must not deal the best hand to the terrorists, they will have triumphed if they succeed in 
replacing the word “Freedom” carved into our hearts and minds, with the word “Feardom”.  
 
                                                 
42Sun Tzu, op.cit. III, § 6, 7.  
